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Abstract
This paper contends that the discourses that assume or assert that Islam and pacifism are 
incompatible are mistaken. They are premised on a homogenising discourse of Islam 
and of pacifism, inattention to Islam as an extant (rather than abstract) phenomenon, 
logical inconsistencies, and a limited Qur’anic hermeneutic. In contrast, I argue that 
Islam and pacifism are compatible, because pacifism has different meanings, because 
of de facto pacifism in Islam, because the logic of Islam, in certain cases, points towards 
pacifism, because pacifism can be discerned in the Qur’an and Hadith, because there 
is a concept of the secular within Islam that allows for pacifism, and because it is the 
image of Muslim violence that is primarily responsible for the belief that Islam and 
pacifism are incompatible.
INTRODUCTION
That Islam and pacifism are incompatible is a common assertion or assumption. This 
discourse of incompatibility takes different forms, which we can group into three types. 
Firstly, pacifism is represented as incompatible with the core Islamic tradition. This tradition 
provides an example of the Prophet as warrior, and an entirely understandable suggestion 
that all Muslims should seek to follow his example. The Qur’an explicitly sanctions the use 
of force in self-defence, to resist injustice, and to ensure that Islam can be practised freely. 
Thus, jihad can take the form of military struggle, and, in the appropriate circumstances, 
is a duty for all Muslims. Because pacifism holds that military force can never be justified, 
this line of argument goes, Islam and pacifism are incompatible. Secondly, there are various 
conflicts around the world that include people who participate, in some sense, in the name 
of Islam. In Samuel Huntington’s words: ‘Islam has bloody borders’ (Huntington 1993: 35) 
– with Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism, Western capitalism and nation states, secularism, 
Buddhism, and more. This is represented as indicative of an essential bellicosity in Islam 
– whether in the religion, culture, or Muslim psyche - that is manifestly incompatible 
with pacifism. Thirdly, pacifism depends on a separation of the sphere of religion from 
the (secular) sphere of society, and because no such separation is possible in Islam, Islam 
is logically incompatible with pacifism. This argument was made by David Martin in his 
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classic text on pacifism: Islam is ‘a lay religion which frowns upon religious orders’ (Martin 
1965: 21), and it is such orders that have the potential to formulate the sort of otherworldly 
perfectionism that makes pacifism possible.
It is my contention, which I expound in this paper, that these discourses are all mistaken. 
They are premised on a homogenising discourse of Islam and of pacifism, inattention to 
Islam as an extant (rather than abstract) phenomenon, logical inconsistencies, and a limited 
Qur’anic hermeneutic. In contrast, I argue that Islam and pacifism are compatible, for 
reasons that are here grouped into six sections: the meaning of pacifism; de facto pacifism 
in Islam; the logic of Islam (which, in certain cases, points towards pacifism); the core 
tradition (that is, pacifism in the Qur’an and Hadith); the concept of the secular (I argue, 
against Martin, that there is a concept of the secular in Islam, and so, even if the separation 
of the religious and secular spheres is a necessary precondition for pacifism, pacifism is still 
logically possible); and the image of Muslim violence (which image, I contend, is primarily 
responsible for the belief that Islam and pacifism are incompatible). I will discuss these 
points, in turn, shortly.
Before doing so, it seems appropriate to consider the question of what right a ‘non-
Muslim’ (like myself) has to write about such issues. This is particularly important because 
this paper includes discussion of the ‘logic of Islam’ and the ‘core tradition’; in other words, 
I permit myself to interpret the core texts and principles of Islam, and to draw conclusions 
about their meaning. Some people would (and do) argue that I have no right to do so, 
because I am not a Muslim – at least not in the conventionally understood sense of the 
word – and, as such, I have not committed myself to the Qur’an as divine revelation, to the 
truth of Islam, or even to its relevance. Ijtihad, the struggle to interpret the requirements 
of Islam-as-practice, is properly an Islamic exercise. In contrast, so the argument runs, I 
am not committing myself to anything by writing this article; I am merely performing 
an academic exercise that seeks to impose commitments on others (but, to emphasise the 
point, not myself).
It is not hard to be sympathetic with this argument, but it must be rejected, at least in 
its ‘hard’ form, for three reasons. Firstly, the argument presented in this article is permissive, 
not prescriptive. It argues that Islam and pacifism are compatible, certainly not that Islam, 
correctly understood, necessarily entails pacifism. Some parts of the argument contend that 
Islam logically entails pacifism, but I do not claim that there is no counter-argument. In fact, 
the purpose of this article, as I have conceived it, is primarily to undermine an idea of Islam 
as monolithic. This is a project that is central to the critique of Orientalism, many Muslims 
have commented on its necessity, and it is hard to see how it can be undertaken without 
interpreting the texts and principles of Islam itself. Secondly, Edward Said explicitly, and 
rightly, rejects ‘the limited proposition that only . . . a Muslim [can write] about Islam’ (Said 
1995: 322; see also Said 1985: 27). A claim that Islam is necessarily opposed to pacifism is 
an attempt to impose a boundary around Islam, to exclude a group or groups of people 
from membership of that category. But these boundaries must be questioned, because 
such questioning is essential both to the social scientific understanding of Islam and to the 
critique of Orientalism. Therefore, a social scientist who is interested in Islam, or a critic 
of Orientalism, must be able to examine these boundaries. In any case, if only Muslims are 
capable of understanding Islam, then it must also be the case that only ‘non-Muslims’ are 
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capable of understanding ‘non-Muslim’ representations of Islam, and, since ‘non-Muslim’ 
representations of Islam are an essential part of my argument, I as a ‘non-Muslim’ am 
qualified to write this article in a way that Muslim writers are not. This is clearly untenable. 
Thirdly, it is necessary for other ‘non-Muslims’—including, I hope, some readers of this 
article—to understand that speaking (or writing) the words ‘Islam’ and ‘peace’ in the same 
sentence is not merely a part of the discourse of an anaemic ‘lowest-common-denominator’ 
civic religion, nor is it part of an attempt to provide ‘excuses’ for acts of terrorism or to 
mislead people about the ‘true’ nature of Islam. It would seem idealistic if I were to claim 
that such is the objective of this article, and it would be misleading, because my objectives 
are more straightforwardly academic. However, it does provide much of the inspiration for 
this article, and why I believe that the project of highlighting areas of compatibility between 
Islam and pacifism is a worthwhile project.
THE MEANING OF PACIFISM
The above discourses of incompatibility, particularly the first and third, suffer from a 
narrow conception of pacifism. The essential distinction is between absolute (or universal) 
pacifism on the one hand, and vocational pacifism on the other. The former denotes a form 
of pacifism that is held to be normative for a whole society and indeed for the whole of 
humanity. The latter denotes pacifism as a lifestyle for a group of people, such as a monastic 
order. It was only around the beginning of the twentieth century that universal pacifism 
became socially significant, and thus the term ‘pacifism’ was born (originally in French, 
but soon afterwards in English and other languages). What had existed beforehand, for the 
most part, was vocational pacifism. So religious virtuosi (to use Max Weber’s term), such 
as the monks and nuns of Catholicism and Buddhism, were expected to live as pacifists, 
but this was not held to be a normative principle for the State or for secular society. It 
was part of what set the religious virtuosi apart from that society. Where whole religious 
communities—such as the Quakers or Anabaptists—were pacifist, this was also a case of 
vocational pacifism. True, it was not just the leaders or virtuosi who would live as pacifists, 
but pacifism was a part of the vocation of the entire community, it was a function of their 
self-definition as ‘a peculiar people’, a religious community set apart from the world. In 
other words, pacifism was a part of what distinguished them from non-Quakers or non-
Anabaptists, and it was essential to this rigid distinction between the faithful and the world 
that pacifism could not be a universal norm, valid for humanity as a whole.
A secondary distinction that needs to be observed is between pacifism as opposition 
to war and pacifism as opposition to violence. In the writings of Tolstoy (1921) and Paul 
Ricoeur (2001), pacifism (or non-violence, which Ricoeur contrasts with ‘a certain pacifism’ 
that remains passive in the face of injustice) is defined as opposition to violence, not war, 
and violence is defined as coercion (physical and, we might add, following Pierre Bourdieu 
and his collaborators, symbolic [e.g. Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992]), exercised par excellence by the State in order to assert its authority, to transform the 
revolutionary impulse that is at the foundation of every state into a statutory, bureaucratic, 
authoritarian order. Pacifism, therefore, is opposition to such violence, a reversion to the 
revolutionary impulse, and this may not be entirely ‘peaceful’. Where Islam is conceived in 
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terms of opposing injustice in the name of the absolute justice that is a property of God, 
and where pacifism is conceived as opposition to violence qua the coercion exercised by the 
State, there is no incompatibility between Islam and pacifism. It is the coercion itself that is 
incompatible with the Qur’anic dictum of ‘no compulsion in religion’ (Surah 2:256).
Where pacifism is not conceived in these terms, however, it is vocational pacifism that is 
incompatible with Islam, not universal pacifism. David Martin is right when he points out 
that Islam’s rejection of a ‘double standard’ between the religious virtuosi and the laity (this 
is expressed in the Hadith which states that there is ‘no monkery in Islam’) or between the 
believers and the unbelievers (all of who are subject to the absolute sovereignty of Allah and 
the moral principles issuing from that sovereignty) is logically incompatible with vocational 
pacifism, though it should be emphasised that it is vocational pacifism to which Martin 
refers, not universal pacifism.
Even the example of the Prophet as warrior does not prove that Islam is incompatible 
with absolute or universal pacifism. This is because it is not a necessary feature of pacifism 
that the pacifist take a position on wars that happened in the past. There is no practical 
purpose in doing so, and it is much more productive to focus one’s energies on opposing 
wars that are taking place at the present time, or that may occur in the foreseeable future. 
In addition, what is called ‘war’ at the present time and what was called ‘war’ in the first 
century AH (that is, the first century of the Muslim calendar, which began in 622AD/CE) 
are qualitatively quite different, and therefore the Prophetic example cannot be imported 
into the twenty-first century without extensive contextualisation. Such contextualisation 
would have to take account of the injunctions – laid down in the Qur’an and Hadith – that 
are aimed at the prevention of what is today called ‘collateral damage’. In today’s context, 
these injunctions seem so restrictive as to make the promotion of war, in any circumstances, 
difficult to justify.
DE FACTO PACIFISM IN ISLAM
There is a contrast between theological and sociological analysis when it comes to the 
relationship between Islam and Muslims. Whereas the former (which is also the discourse of 
many practising, believing Muslims) takes Islam as an a priori, laid down in the foundational 
texts of Islam and developments of Islamic theology and law, and defines Muslims as those 
who conform to the precepts, beliefs and practices of Islam, the latter (which is common 
to the form of analysis found across the social sciences and humanities) takes Muslims as 
the a priori – that is, all who regard themselves as Muslims and are widely accepted as such 
by other Muslims – and defines Islam as the de facto beliefs and practices of Muslims qua 
Muslims. Analysed sociologically, then, it is sufficient to demonstrate that there are Muslims 
who are pacifist, and who understand their pacifism in Islamic terms, in order to show 
that Islam is compatible with pacifism. Given that there are about 900 million Muslims 
worldwide, it would be very surprising were this not the case.
It does, nevertheless, seem necessary (whether epistemologically or practically) to 
augment this argument in two ways: firstly, to provide examples of such de facto pacifism 
in Islam; secondly, to show that Islam and pacifism are also theologically compatible, in the 
above sense of theological. I will deal with the theological question later. Examples of 
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de facto pacifism in Islam include the following. Firstly, there is the quietism of many Sufi 
groups. While this does not necessarily show a political commitment to pacifism as such, 
it nevertheless encapsulates pacifism as a way of life, initially in the vocational sense, and, 
through the Sufi yearning for the realisation of the unity of all things with the Divine, in 
a universal or absolute sense as well. Secondly, there is the explicit pacifism articulated by 
members of the Bahá’í faith, who call for the abolition of war and propose various means 
to accomplish that goal. Although the Bahá’í are not regarded as Muslims, nor do they 
regard themselves as Muslims, but as a different faith altogether, it is nevertheless the case 
that their roots are in Islam (specifically Shaykhism, a nineteenth-century form of Iranian 
Twelver Shi’ism), and that the reason for their separation from Islam has nothing to do 
with their pacifism. Rather, it is their rejection of the orthodox Islamic doctrine of nabawwa 
(prophecy) – specifically the belief that Muhammad is the seal of the Prophets, the final 
Messenger sent by God to Humankind – in favour of a belief that God has continued to 
send Prophets up to the present day (and will in all likelihood continue to do so), that 
constitutes that reason. Thirdly, ‘progressive Islamist’ scholars such as Farid Esack in South 
Africa have consciously sought to ground Qur’anic interpretation in a ‘hermeneutic circle’ 
that emphasises the experience of oppression (including sexist oppression), a transformed 
and de-reified understanding of the Qur’an in the light of this experience of oppression, 
inter-religious solidarity against oppression, and an active opposition to the oppressive 
violence of the state as analysed by such writers as Tolstoy and Ricoeur (Esack 1997). Many 
of these principles are common to a range of liberal Islamic ideas (e.g. Arkoun 1984, 1994; 
Rahman 1979, 1999; see also Kurzman 1998), and may at least potentially be manifest in a 
political commitment to pacifism, in one form or another. Fourthly, organisations like the 
Muslim Peace Fellowship in the United States do turn such principles – whether they are as 
sophisticated as the hermeneutic circle or simply based on a ‘fresh’, ‘open-minded’ reading 
of the Qur’an – into a commitment to non-violence or pacifism. Such epistemology and 
praxis is also articulated or reported by a number of authors and contributors to edited 
collections, although they do not constitute an organisation as such (Satha-Anand 1990, 
1996; Paige, Satha-Anand and Gilliat 1993; Johansen 1997; Harris 1998; Said, Funk and 
Kadayifi 2001, Said, Funk and Kadayifi 2002).
THE LOGIC OF ISLAM
Of course, it may well be objected that Islam being sociologically compatible with pacifism 
means no more than that there are certain Muslims who, however misguidedly, regard Islam 
and pacifism as compatible. It would no doubt be possible to find some Muslims, out of the 
900 million or so Muslims worldwide, who believe almost anything and who articulate that 
belief in Islamic terms. As such, there could be atheists, or polytheists, or devil worshippers, 
who regard themselves as Muslim and their atheism, polytheism or devil worship as entirely 
compatible with Islam. However, it would stretch credulity to say that Islam can still be 
Islam if it abandons its belief in tawhid (monotheism, or divine unicity) for one of these 
systems of belief or practice. So, the objection runs, de facto pacifism among (those who refer 
to themselves as) Muslims proves nothing.
I have already hinted (I think) that I consider the sociological form of analysis, as 
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expounded in the previous section, to be an epistemological presupposition. As such, it is 
neither more nor less grounded than the theological form of analysis. I do not know, nor 
can I conceive of, any reason to suppose that either form of analysis is inherently superior 
to the other. So, I will not attempt to argue against the aforementioned objection. Rather, 
I will argue that Islam, as well as being sociologically compatible with pacifism, is also 
theologically compatible with pacifism. I argue this in two ways. Firstly, in this section, I 
argue in terms of the logic of Islam. That is, I argue that certain elements of Islam, that 
are theologically core elements, logically entail an acceptance that Islam and pacifism are 
compatible. (I do not suggest that these core elements necessarily entail a commitment to 
pacifism, because this would impose a monolithic understanding of Islam, albeit a different 
monolithic understanding from the usual one.) Second, in the next section, I argue that 
pacifist principles are elucidated in the ‘core tradition’ of Islam – the Qur’an and Hadith 
– itself.
In order to argue from the logic of Islam, I begin with the concept of jihad. This concept 
is popularly thought to mean ‘holy war’, and it is undeniably true that one of its meanings 
– both in the ‘core tradition’ of Islam and in later traditions – is a military one. However, as 
has been pointed out countless times, jihad actually means effort, or struggle. The English 
word struggle can have a military connotation, but its meaning is not essentially military. It 
is the same with the Arabic word jihad. Furthermore, the Prophet Muhammad is quoted in 
the Hadith literature as saying that the lesser jihad, which was military in nature, was past, 
but the greater jihad, which was spiritual in nature – struggling against the baser instincts to 
be a better person and a better Muslim – lay ahead. As such, struggling to establish peace in 
a situation of conflict can be an act of jihad, and so the existence of that concept does not 
in itself invalidate the argument that Islam and pacifism are incompatible.
It is sometimes said that jihad is the sixth pillar of Islam. This is manifestly not the case, 
however, because Islam has five pillars, not six. But let us accept, for the sake of argument, 
that jihad is an obligation on all Muslims, and that jihad has, in certain circumstances, a 
military meaning. This was the first form of the ‘discourse of incompatibility’ between Islam 
and pacifism that was identified in the introduction, and it is indeed a persuasive argument. 
In contrast, however, it can be argued that it neglects the necessary priority of islam over 
jihad. The former concept can be translated as peace, or being at peace (through submission 
to Allah), and it is, of course, the name of the religion under discussion (and the name 
‘Islam’, unlike ‘Christianity’, is not an accident of history, but the name that the Qur’an 
asserts was given to the religion by God [Surah 5:3]). So, for all meanings of jihad, it is jihad 
that is a tenet of Islam, not vice versa. So jihad must be interpreted in the context of islam, 
or struggle in the context of peace. It is not unreasonable to suggest that this logically entails 
a rejection of war as incompatible with peace, and so it is possible to make this suggestion 
within, rather than against, an Islamic discourse. Incidentally, Farid Esack suggests that jihad 
is an aspect of iman rather than islam, or faith rather than practice, which separates it still 
further from the discourse of incompatibility between Islam and pacifism.
One of the five (not six) pillars of Islam is, of course, the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Bawa Yamba (1995: 182) points out that: ‘During jihad the road to Mecca is, of necessity, 
closed – both in reality and symbolically’. In other words, during jihad there can be no hajj, 
and, by deduction, since the hajj is a pillar of Islam and jihad is not, there can be no jihad 
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when it interferes with the hajj. Of course, the hajj only takes place at a certain time of year, 
and in any case there is no obligation to perform the hajj if one is unable to do so, and jihad 
may well constitute a reason for being unable to do so. However, the hajj is more than just 
an annual event. This becomes apparent when we consider the following. Approximately 2 
million Muslims perform the hajj every year. There are approximately 900 million Muslims 
in the world. Therefore, it would take 450 years for all of the Muslims who are currently 
alive to perform the hajj, which would clearly be impossible. We can calculate that (given 
that some Muslims perform the hajj more than once) no more than 15 per cent of Muslims 
worldwide perform the hajj, while at least 85 per cent do not. So the vast majority of 
Muslims do not perform the hajj, but it is still a pillar of Islam for them, as much as for those 
who actually make the journey to Mecca. For it to be a pillar of Islam in any meaningful 
sense for the majority of Muslims, then, two things are necessary. Firstly, they need to have 
the intention, or at least hope, of performing the pilgrimage one day. Secondly, the hajj must 
somehow become an aspect of the Muslim’s daily life. It is as if the Muslim is always on, 
or preparing for, hajj, and therefore the gate to Mecca must always be open. So, according 
to the logic of Islam, jihad in any sense that would close the gates to Mecca, including a 
military sense, can be interpreted as incompatible with the fifth pillar of Islam. So pacifism 
is necessarily compatible with Islam. Perhaps that is one reason why it has long been a 
principle of Twelver Shi’a Islam that ‘there is no holy war in the absence of the Last Imam’ 
(Loeffler 1988: 237), and even Ayatollah Khomeini’s teachings have not entirely succeeded 
in extinguishing this principle.
THE CORE TRADITION
The objection still stands, however, that sociological and logical arguments are insignificant 
when seen against the teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith, which Muslims take to be 
inspired – directly in the case of the Qur’an, indirectly in the case of the Hadith – by God. 
However, although the Qur’an and Hadith can be, and are, cited in support of a military 
concept of jihad, they can also be cited in support of the argument that Islam and pacifism 
are compatible. I have already mentioned two examples: the notion of the greater jihad as 
a spiritual struggle, explicitly contrasted with military struggle; and the rules laid down for 
the prevention of ‘collateral damage’.
There are two excerpts from the Qur’an that, while less specific, make the point in terms 
of theological principle. Surah 2:115, a verse that has been cited in a great deal of Sufi 
writing, says that ‘wherever you turn there is the face of God’. It seems hard to conceive of 
a fellow human being as showing ‘the face of God’, and yet kill that human being, which 
would be necessary in war. Surah 25:63 says that ‘the true servants of Allah are those who 
walk humbly upon the earth and when molested by the ignorant reply “Peace”’, which does 
not sound very different from the injunction of Jesus Christ, as reported in the Gospels, to 
‘turn the other cheek’, and this injunction has been one of the foundations of Christian 
pacifism, vocational and universal, for centuries.
Although, for some, these arguments are the most important, I deal with them very 
briefly, because all that is necessary is to show that there are some texts from the Qur’an 
or Hadith that can reasonably be interpreted in pacifist terms. It would be possible to look 
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at the various interpretations and exegeses of these texts that have been proffered (such as 
those discussed by Gätje 1996), but this would be to take them out of the core tradition 
and into the evolving historical tradition – which would not be a bad thing in itself, but 
would be superfluous in this context. Having shown that there are texts that can reasonably 
be interpreted in pacifist terms, then, we have established that Islam and pacifism are 
compatible in a way that is rooted in the core tradition of Islam.
The question remains, however, of why it is that violence is sometimes justified in the 
name of the Qur’an. This is an important question. In the aftermath of the hijacking and 
crashing of four aeroplanes in the United States, on 11 September 2001, sales of the Qur’an 
in the USA and elsewhere increased significantly, presumably because people were asking 
themselves the same question and wanted to know what had motivated the hijackers. If so, 
they will have been disappointed. There is nothing in the Qur’an to justify such actions, 
but, for the believer in a scriptural religion, allegiance to the text itself often supersedes 
attention to its contents. The fact that the believer demonstrates a passionate allegiance to the 
text therefore justifies anything that the believer does as a believer. This is not a criticism of 
religion per se, nor is it an attempt to absolve the theological refinements of religion from 
any worldly responsibility, but it is an argument for investigating the foundations of religion, 
which (at least at the sociological level) are human foundations, not divine revelations or 
superstitious deceptions. These foundations can support violence or pacifism.
THE CONCEPT OF THE SECULAR
The remaining objection is the one presented in the introduction to this paper, taken 
from David Martin’s work, which is that pacifism depends on a separation of the religious 
and secular spheres, and because no such separation is possible in Islam, Islam is logically 
incompatible with pacifism. The apparent ‘double standard’ of the ‘two kingdoms’ theology 
is inconsistent with the spirit of Islam, but, as we have already remarked, this only shows 
that Islam is incompatible with vocational pacifism, as outlined earlier. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that there is no distinction between the religious and secular spheres in 
Islam. This is for two reasons, the first of which can be expressed in terms of the diffusionist 
principle in anthropological theory, the second in terms of principles internal to Islam as a 
practice and as a project.
If there is no distinction between the religious and the secular, there is no concept of the 
secular, because both concepts – religious and secular – exist only in contradistinction to 
one another. So, if the concept of the secular exists in Islam, there is prima facie a distinction 
between the religious and secular spheres. No society or culture exists in isolation, but they 
borrow from one another, and frequently keep what they have borrowed. Thus, even if the 
concept of the secular was originally Christian or Western, this does not mean that it is 
illegitimate in a Muslim society. This may seem relatively uncontroversial, but its application 
to Islam has raised some profound questions about the nature of Western scholarship, as 
Edward Said and others have shown. Clifford Geertz (1993: 170) remarks that: ‘Our view of 
religions . . . is oddly static. We expect them to prosper or decline; we do not expect them to 
change’; an expectation of stasis that is even more marked in the case of Islam. Said (1995) 
has defined Orientalism partly in terms of a supposition that the Orient (including Islam) 
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was homogeneous and unchanging. So, the Muslim Orient has been regarded as incapable 
of incorporating or learning anything from the West, and, of course, it has been regarded as 
unnecessary for the West to learn or absorb anything from the Orient.
In more epistemological terms, we can consider Aziz Al-Azmeh’s criticisms of Orientalists, 
and of some Muslims, who perpetuate a discourse of cultural authenticity. Recognition of 
the diversity of Islam entails a critique of homogenising discourses of Islam, or an anti-
historicism that is predicated both on the stasis of Muslim society, and on the impossibility 
of cultural and conceptual diffusion. Al-Azmeh argues that there has been ‘an objective 
complicity between [Orientalist discourses of] exoticism and the [so-called ‘fundamentalist’] 
rhetoric of identity and authenticity . . . , [which is] both past and future linked congenitally 
by the ontological void of today’ (Al-Azmeh 1996: 28, 89). For our purposes, a critique of 
this notion, that cultural and conceptual diffusion are impossible, must address the diffusion 
of the concept of the secular, and if this concept is not to be regarded as an illegitimate 
accretion of the present day onto the Prophetic past and the utopian, Messianic future, then 
we must recognise that its diffusion is a part of the history of Muslim societies, and indeed 
of an Islamic history that is conceived in ‘sociological’ (as the term has been used in this 
article) and anti-essentialist terms.
But the argument is not just epistemological, for there has been an internal distinction, 
within Islam, between the religious and the secular, or an analogous distinction, for centuries. 
According to Mohammed Mouaqit (1984), the ideological basis of secularisation has 
proceeded from monotheism itself, because (to simplify) monotheism monopolises the 
symbolic system and so the temporal becomes profane, separate from the religious.
In his analysis of the concept of asabiyyah in his fourteenth-century Muqaddimah, Ibn 
Khaldun not only makes an implicit distinction between a secular state and a religious 
community, but suggests that the secular state is essential to the religious community. Erwin 
Rosenthal (1965: 18) explains the concept as follows:
‘Asabiya is a concept of Ibn Khaldun’s that has aroused the opposition of modern orthodox 
Muslim thinkers . . . [H]e stresses its significance, saying it is needed for the success of 
prophecy and of da‘wa . . . Its foremost role . . . he assigns to the power-state, for ‘asabiya 
is a corporate feeling; a common bond, due in the first place to ties of blood and family 
tradition, creating a sense of solidarity; it inspires common action and is an indispensable 
driving force in the formation of states and dynasties.
So, asabiyyah is a driving force in the formation of states and dynasties, for example the 
modern nation state, and it is a secular concept. However, Ibn Khaldun (1967:414 [I,364]) 
argues:
All religious laws and practices and everything that the masses are expected to do requires 
group feeling [asabiyyah] . . . Group feeling is necessary to the Muslim community. Its 
existence enables (the community) to fulfil what God expects of it.
So, asabiyyah is necessary to the Muslim community. Significantly, the Arabic word that is 
translated as ‘community’ is not ummah, but millah. The important difference is that ummah 
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connotes a spiritual community of the world’s Muslims, and is therefore a religious concept 
and not a secular concept, whereas a millah was a group that was defined in religious terms, 
but that existed as a political entity for the purposes of, for example, government and 
taxation. Thus, there is a distinction between the ummah and the millah, or between the 
religious and the secular.
Rosenthal also pointed out that asabiyyah was essential for the success of prophecy 
and the propagation of Islam. To express this in secular terms, we can equate the concept 
of asabiyyah with nationalism or national identity (although the concepts should not be 
confused). Nationalism and national identities constitute a dilemma for those Muslims who 
wish to promote Islam as a political project. Not only have secularisation – problematic for 
those committed to such a project – and the emergence of national identities have been 
parts of a common historical process2, but national and ethnic sentiments or identities can 
undermine the unity of the Muslim ummah, and they can lead to a confusion of national 
or local customs with the values and practices of Islam, or even a subordination of religious 
imperatives to the expediency of the nation state. However, nationalism and national 
identities have played a leading role in liberating ‘Muslim’ countries from ‘Western’ rule, 
and in some cases this has led to some sort of Islamic government. In a world of nation 
states, an Islamic project must ally itself with the nation in order to fulfil the raison d’être of 
Islam as a total system, as din wa dawla. So, asabiyyah is even now a necessary feature of the 
political Islamic movement, and, by extension, the ideas of the so-called ‘fundamentalists’ or 
‘orthodox Muslims’ whose rhetoric is particularly opposed to asabiyyah.
Therefore, there is necessarily a concept of the secular in Islam, even those forms of 
Islam that are consciously anti-secular, so this reason for asserting that Islam and pacifism 
are incompatible does not stand up.
THE IMAGE OF MUSLIM VIOLENCE
I have argued that Islam and pacifism are compatible – in terms of the nature of pacifism, 
sociologically, in terms of the logic of Islam, in the core tradition of Islam, and because of a 
secular tradition within Islam – and I have remarked that Islam is perceived as violent when 
allegiance to the text itself supersedes allegiance to its content. The perception of Muslim 
violence is also constructed and refracted through centuries-old Western representations of 
Islam, as Edward Said (e.g. 1993, 1995, 1997) and others have shown, and these discourses 
influence Muslims’ perception of themselves and their religion. There has been and remains 
a dominant Western belief that Islam was spread by the sword. Certainly, there are a few 
examples of conversion to Islam going hand in hand with military conquest, but, as has 
been observed on countless occasions, this has never been the norm. Arab armies conquered 
Egypt about three centuries before Islam became the majority religion there. The Mogul 
armies conquered vast swathes of Muslim territory before eventually converting to Islam 
themselves. The Crusades were seen as providing further evidence that Islam was a violent 
religion, but such violence was evaluated inconsistently. That of the Crusader armies was 
 2  See, for example, Anderson 1991: 9–19; Hobsbawm 1991: 67–79; McCrone 1998: 93; though 
compare Hastings 1997: 185–209 and, of course, various contributors to the sociology of religion.
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legitimated in terms of indulgence (reduction of time in purgatory for oneself or other 
people), necessity or duty, while that of the Muslim armies provided evidence of cruelty 
or a propensity to violence that was innate to Muslims (Miles and Brown 2003: 28; Daniel 
1960: 109-13, 1975: 111-39).
This violent image was not constant, and there were conversions to Islam in England 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Also, the sensual stereotype – belly dancers, 
harems, snake charmers – which had existed in the Middle Ages, was systematised in 
nineteenth-century Orientalist writings. There were differences: French Orientalists often 
saw the Muslim world as dominated by (almost Freudian) sexual symbolism, while British 
Orientalists saw a kind of Oriental indolence which was a consequence of religion and 
climate (see, for example, Said 1995: 40, 182-8). At this time, the Orient, the Muslim world, 
was exotic. The image of Islam as a threat developed from the opening of the Suez Canal 
– which made the Orient much closer and no longer exotic – to the present day via the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the oil crisis of the 1970s, the Iranian Revolution, the Rushdie 
affair, 9/11, and so on. The image of Muslim irrationality seems as close as we can get to 
an historical constant (though the use of Arabic manuscripts in Western centres of learning 
before the Crusades undermines even that).
One variable that has contributed to the violent image of Islam, and thus the view that 
Islam and pacifism are incompatible, has been the significance of physical signifiers and the 
attribution of ‘racial’ (phenotypical and behavioural) characteristics, that is, racialisation. 
The term ‘racialisation’ is used by Miles and Brown (2003: 101) ‘to denote those instances 
where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human 
biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social 
collectivities’. Where Muslims are represented as sharing innate biological (including 
phenotypical) or behavioural characteristics, it is likely that they are being racialised, and 
such representation has been observed as characteristic of Islamophobia (e.g. Brown 2000). 
A consequence of such racialisation is that violence is seen not simply as characteristic of 
Muslims, but as innate to Muslims.
However, the issue is more complex. Sociological theories of racism and racialisation 
are almost unanimous on the modernity of these phenomena. The theories are correct, 
because racism was not a normal way of thinking before the late eighteenth century, though 
other forms of representation and exclusion (including religious exclusion) were. However, 
there are isolated empirical examples of racism, or something like racism, which predate 
the modern period. In Pope Urban II’s speech initiating the First Crusade, he referred to 
the Muslim armies as ‘Persian’, ‘an alien people, a race completely foreign to God’, ‘unclean 
people, who . . . defile the Holy Places with their filth’ (cited in Williams 1990: 35). This ‘filth’ 
would not have been understood in terms of ceremonial impurity, because that concept 
was peripheral to Western Christianity, but in terms of the ‘foreign’, quasi-racialised Other. 
Thus, the violence of the Crusaders was not carried out solely against Muslims, but also Jews, 
pagans and even Eastern Christians, who shared religious similarities with the Crusaders but 
who were also represented as a quasi-‘racial’ Other (Miles and Brown 2003: 29).
The current stereotype of Muslim violence and terrorism seems paradoxically de-
racialised. However, what is crucial is the combination of racialisation and de-racialisation. 
Islam is represented as ideologically homogeneous, Muslims as ‘racially’ homogeneous, 
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and therefore Muslims are represented in toto as constituting a threat. In this context, it 
is not surprising that Islam is represented in Western discourses as essentially violent, and 
therefore incompatible with pacifism. Nor is it surprising, given the hegemony of such 
discourses, that they influence Muslims’ perceptions of themselves and their own religion. 
Consequently, therefore, it should not be surprising that Muslims, as well as those who 
represent Islam in more Orientalist terms, should articulate the discourse of incompatibility 
between Islam and pacifism.
CONCLUSION
Islam is sociologically and theologically compatible with pacifism, both at the foundational 
level and in the logical and historical developments from those foundations. The image of 
Islam as essentially violent, and of the Muslim as terrorist, is based on historical contingency, 
a selective interpretation of Islam (carried out in Orientalist representation and by some 
Muslims), and on a process of de-racialisation. The racialisation of the Muslim creates an 
image of the Arab, the Pakistani, the Afghan or the Iranian as terrorist, and an amalgam 
(which French Muslims have called an ‘Islamalgame’) of religion, nationality and violence.
This amalgam is a self-fulfilling prophecy, which makes the world a more dangerous 
place. When Orientalist fears are interpreted as Muslim radicalism, and the deafness of the 
West is interpreted as the silence of the Muslim majority, violence may be the only form 
of communication left, and violence begets violence. Understanding Islam in its depth, 
complexity and diversity, and understanding Western perceptions of Islam in their depth, 
complexity and diversity, are two things that we scholars can do to restrain this danger.
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